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Abstract	
Two	experiments	are	reported	in	which	people	resolve	references	to	sets	of	entities	(e.g.	
lies)	that	have	previously	been	introduced	either	explicitly	into	a	text	(“the	lies”)	or	implicitly	
via	a	cognate	verb	(a	form	of	the	verb	“to	lie”).	Pronominal	references	to	such	entities	were	
judged	as	relatively	unacceptable,	and	required	longer	judgement	times	when	judgements	
were	positive,	compared	to	cases	in	which	the	antecedent	was	explicit.	This	finding	suggests	
that	the	inference	from	the	activity	of	lying	to	a	set	of	lies	is	made	in	the	backwards	
direction	(Garnham	&	Oakhill,	Quarterly	Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology,	40A,	719-735)	.	
Results	with	full	noun	phrase	anaphors	show	a	different	pattern,	with	no	penalty	in	either	
times	or	acceptability	judgements	for	the	implicit	case.	The	results	are	discussed	in	terms	of	
Sanford	and	Garrod’s	(1981,	Understanding	written	language)	hypotheses	about	reference	
processing	and	the	notion	of	the	centrality	of	an	antecedent	in	a	scenario.	
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Looking	back	to	“Anaphoric	Islands”	
In	an	influential	paper,	Postal	(1969)	noted	that,	although	the	interpretation	of	
“them”	in	(1)	should	clearly	be	Max’s	parents,	(1)	is	not	an	allowable	way	of	expressing	this	
intended	message	in	English.	
(1) Max	is	an	orphan	and	he	deeply	misses	them.	
Using	an	analogy	from	the	work	of	Haj	Ross	(1967)	on	what	were	then	regarded	as	
movement	rules	in	syntax,	Postal	argued	that	lexical	items,	“orphan”	in	this	case,	are	
anaphoric	islands	to	what	he	called	outbound	anaphora,	where	the	lexical	item	is	supposed	
to	contain	the	antecedent	for	an	anaphor	outside	of	it.	Postal	considered	the	anaphoric	
island	phenomenon	to	be	all-or-none,	and	argued	that	the	constraint	was	a	syntactic	one.	
Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988)	showed	that	attempts	to	refer	into	anaphoric	islands	
both	slowed	people	down	and	reduced	judgements	of	acceptability,	compared	to	the	case	
where	the	antecedent	was	explicit.	However,	a	substantial	number	of	positive	acceptability	
judgements	were	still	recorded	in	the	anaphoric	islands	versions.	Furthermore,	pronominal	
references	into	anaphoric	islands	are	relatively	common	in	everyday	language	(e.g.	Oakhill	&	
Garnham,	1992;	Ward	et	al.,	1991).	In	Garnham	and	Oakhill’s	(1988)	materials,	unlike	in	(1),	
there	was	a	morphological	relation	between	the	lexical	item	that	was	the	anaphoric	island	
and	the	obvious	way	of	presenting	the	antecedent	explicitly,	as	in	(2).		
(2) Little	Billy	always	lies	to	his	mother,	but	they	are	never	convincing.	
Following	the	publication	of	Postal’s	paper,	a	number	of	linguists	(e.g.	Tic	
Douloureux,	1971;	Lakoff	&	Ross,	1972;	Corum,	1973;	Watt	1975)	suggested	that	the	
anaphoric	island	phenomenon	was	graded,	rather	than	all-or-none,	and	that	morphological	
relatedness	was	one	of	the	factors	that	made	anaphoric	reference	into	an	anaphoric	island	
more	acceptable.	Later,	Gregory	Ward	(Ward,	Sproat,	&	McKoon,	1991;	Ward	1997)	
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proposed	that	the	constraints	on	reference	into	anaphoric	islands	are	pragmatic	in	nature,	
rather	than	syntactic.	From	a	psycholinguistic	point	of	view,	this	idea	suggests	that	attempts	
to	refer	into	anaphoric	islands	should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	general	theories	of	
anaphoric	reference	and	inference.	
One	such	theory	is	the	one	developed	by	Tony	Sanford	and	colleagues	(and	in	
particular	Simon	Garrod,	see	Sanford	&	Garrod,	1981	for	an	early,	detailed	exposition).	A	
crucial	component	of	this	theory	is	the	distinction	between	explicit	and	implicit	focus.	
Explicit	focus	contains	representations	of	things	recently	mentioned	in	a	text,	and	is	the	
natural	domain	in	which	pronouns	find	their	reference.	Implicit	focus	provides	a	so-called	
extended	domain	of	reference,	including	items	whose	existence	is	implied	in	a	text,	but	not	
explicitly	stated.	References	to	items	in	implicit	focus	typically	require	full	noun	phrase	
anaphors.	Sanford	and	Garrod’s	presentation	of	their	ideas	reflects	the	shift	in	thinking	from	
linguistic	expressions	as	the	antecedents	for	anaphors	to	representations	of	objects	
introduced	by	linguistic	expressions	(discourse	referents)	as	antecedents.	
A	somewhat	separate	question	is:	how	easy,	or	difficult,	is	it	for	anaphoric	elements	
to	pick	up	referents	from	their	appropriate	domain	of	reference,	and,	indeed,	how	hard	is	it	
for	them	to	pick	up	referents	from	an	inappropriate	domain?	A	related	issue	is	what	factors	
affect	the	search	for	referents,	and	whether	they	are	the	same	in	the	two	domains	of	
reference.	The	results	of	the	classic	study	of	full	NP	anaphora	by	Haviland	and	Clark	(1974)	
are	readily	reinterpretable	in	the	Sanford	and	Garrod	framework.	In	(3)	the	antecedent	for	
“the	beer”	is	not	explicit,	but	beer	is	a	reasonably	probable	component	of	picnic	supplies	(in	
1970s	California!)	and	so	can	be	thought	of	as	existing	in	the	extended	domain	of	reference.	
(3) We	checked	the	picnic	supplies.	The	beer	was	warm.	
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The	second	sentence	of	(3)	is	readily	interpreted,	but	reading	is	slowed	down	compared	
with	the	case	in	which	beer	is	explicitly	mentioned	as	in	(4).	
(4) We	got	some	beer	out	of	the	trunk.	The	beer	was	warm.	
Later	work	has	shown	that	the	reading	of	full	NP	anaphors	is	not	always	slowed	
down	when	the	antecedent	is	implicit,	and	hence	in	the	extended	domain	of	reference	(e.g.,	
Garrod	&	Sanford,	1981;	Walker	&	Yekovitch,	1987).	Indeed,	there	are	cases	where	the	
interpretation	of	pronouns	that	refer	to	objects	(apparently)	in	the	extended	domain	of	
reference	is	not	slowed	either	(Ward	et	al.,	1991;	Cornish	et	al.,	2005).	The	qualification	
“apparently”	is	added,	because	it	may	be	that	implicit	focus	contains	representation	of	a	
small	number	of	items	that	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	text.	The	exact	
characterisation	of	these	cases	is	not	yet	clear,	but	it	appears	to	involve	some	notion	of	
centrality	of	the	implied	object	in	the	scenario	presented	in	the	text.	
Postal	(1969	restricted	his	discussion	of	NP-anaphora	and	anaphoric	islands	to	
pronouns	rather	than	full	noun	phrase	anaphors.	On	one	reading	of	Postal,	it	might	be	
expected	that	full	NP	anaphors	that	attempt	to	refer	into	anaphoric	islands	would	also	be	
problematic.	However,	(5)	is	not	unacceptable	in	the	way	that	(1)	is.	
(5) Max	is	an	orphan	and	he	deeply	misses	his	parents.	
One	explanation	would	be	that	Max’s	parents	are	in	the	extended	domain	of	reference	
associated	with	the	mention	of	Max,	so	that	“his	parents”	does	not	have	to	be	interpreted	
via	an	anaphoric	reference	into	“orphan”.	Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988),	like	Postal,	
considered	only	the	pronominal	cases.	In	the	experiments	presented	below	we	compared	
these	cases	directly	with	parallel	cases	using	full	NP	anaphors.	As	in	the	original	study,	we	
use	examples	where	there	is	word	form	identity	between	the	verbal	anaphoric	island	(“lies”	
in	(2))	and	the	head	noun	of	the	corresponding	NP,	“the	lies”,	and	cases	where	this	identity	
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is	broken,	by	switching	to	the	past	tense	(“lied”	vs.	“lies”).	In	both	cases,	however,	a	
morphological	relationship	exists	between	the	two	forms,	which	distinguishes	them	from	
the	Haviland	and	Clark	picnic	supplies/beer	examples.	Our	interest	was	in	the	comparison	of	
the	pronoun	and	the	full	NP	cases,	and	the	extent	to	which	our	results	could	be	
accommodated	into	Sanford	and	Garrod’s	framework,	augmented	by	the	notion	of	
centrality	in	a	scenario.	For	the	full	NP	anaphors,	we	predicted	little	or	no	effect	on	
acceptability	as	a	function	of	the	type	of	antecedent,	but	possibly	an	effect	on	reading	
times,	depending	on	how	readily	available	an	antecedent	for	“the	lies”	is	made	by	use	of	a	
form	of	the	verb	“to	lie”,	and	to	what	extent	the	morphological	relationship	aids	the	search	
for	a	referent.	
Experiment	1	
Method	
Participants.	The	participants	were	32	members	of	the	staff	and	student	populations	
of	Sussex	University,	who	had	not	previously	taken	part	other	similar	experiments.	They	
were	paid	for	their	participation.	
Materials.	Thirty-two	sets	of	experimental	materials	were	constructed,	and	four	
passages	were	created	from	each	set	of	materials.		Each	passage	began	with	an	introductory	
sentence,	which	was	presented	in	two	separate	displays,	with	the	division	indicated	by	the	/	
in	(6).	
(6)		 In	our	village	there	is	an	artist	called	Marvin/who	is	quite	well	known.	
The	passage	then	introduced,	either	directly	or	indirectly,	a	set	of	items	of	a	particular	kind	
(e.g.,	sketches)	that	would	be	referred	to	in	the	following	sentence	using	an	anaphoric	noun	
phrase	(e.g.,	“the	sketches”)	or	a	pronoun	(e.g.,	“they”).	When	the	items	were	introduced	
directly,	a	noun	(e.g.,	“sketches”)	was	used,	as	in	(7).	
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(7)	 Every	Sunday	he	makes	sketches	by	the	river.	
In	the	versions	in	which	the	items	were	introduced	indirectly,	a	cognate	verb	(e.g.,	
“sketches”)	was	used,	as	in	(7’).	
(7’)	 Every	Sunday	he	sketches	by	the	river.	
The	last	sentence	included	the	anaphoric	reference	as	in	(8).		
(8)	 The	sketches/They	are	admired	by	everyone.	
Each	passage	therefore	comprised	four	parts,	which	were	shown	in	separate	displays	
to	the	participants.	The	participants’	task	was	to	judge	whether	the	final	part	of	the	passage,	
containing	the	repeated	reference	to	the	set	of	items,	was	a	sensible	continuation	from	the	
rest	of	the	passage.	The	four	passages	derived	from	one	set	of	materials	are	shown	in	Table	
1.	
----------------------	
Table	1	about	here	
-----------------------	
In	addition	to	the	32	experimental	items,	12	filler	items	were	created	in	which	the	final	part	
of	the	passage	was	not	a	sensible	continuation	from	what	had	gone	before.	Participants	
were	expected	to	answer	“no”	to	these	items.	There	were	three	items	of	the	four	types	
mentioned	above,	which	were	the	same	for	all	participants.	An	example	is	shown	in	(10).	
(10)	 Although	the	vineyard	owner	is	a	very	busy	man	
he	still	likes	to	help	his	staff	with	the	bottling	process	
He	corks	the	wine	with	his	own	hands.	
The	corks	are	all	inserted	by	machine.	
Apparatus.	The	experiment	was	run	on	a	PC	fitted	with	an	Advantech	PCLabCard	to	
provide	millisecond-accurate	timing,	and	a	version	of	the	TSCOP	software	(Norris,	1984).	
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The	four	parts	of	the	passages	were	presented	one	at	a	time	on	the	computer’s	monitor,	
with	each	display	starting	8	spaces	from	the	left-hand	side	of	the	screen.	In	front	of	the	
screen,	on	a	bench,	were	two	response	buttons,	one	labelled	"YES"	and	the	other	"NO".	
Design.	There	were	two	main	factors	of	interest.	The	first	was	whether	the	
antecedent	was	provided	explicitly	by	a	noun	or	indirectly	via	a	verb.	The	second	was	
whether	the	anaphor	was	a	full	noun	phrase	or	a	pronoun.	Both	factors	varied	within	
subjects	and	within	materials.	Four	lists	of	materials	were	produced,	with	8	items	in	each	of	
the	four	main	experimental	conditions.	One	passage	from	each	material	set	occurred	in	
each	list,	and	across	the	experiment	each	item	occurred	in	every	condition.	Equal	numbers	
of	participants	saw	each	of	the	four	lists.	
Procedure.	The	participants	were	tested	individually	in	a	small	quiet	laboratory.	The	
order	of	the	passages	was	randomised	separately	for	each	list.	Participants	were	instructed	
to	read	the	passages	at	their	normal	reading	speed	as	though	they	were	reading	a	book	or	a	
magazine.	They	were	told	not	to	spend	too	much	time	thinking	about	their	answer	to	the	
question	about	whether	the	last	display	followed	sensibly	from	the	rest	of	the	passage,	but	
to	base	their	answer	on	their	first	impressions.	They	were	also	told	that	there	were	no	
definitely	right	or	wrong	answers,	but	that	we	expected	that	most	of	the	time	they	would	
think	the	answer	was	obviously	“yes”	or	obviously	“no”.	
The	participants	sat	in	front	of	the	computer	screen	with	the	response	buttons	on	
the	desk	in	front	of	them.	At	the	beginning	of	each	passage	the	prompt	“NEXT	ITEM”	
appeared	on	the	screen.	When	it	appeared,	participants	had	to	press	the	button	on	the	side	
of	their	dominant	hand	to	display	the	first	part	of	the	passage.	Further	presses	displayed	the	
other	three	parts	of	the	passage.	When	the	final	part	of	the	passage	appeared	it	had	a	
“*Y/N*”	prompt	at	the	end	of	the	line	as	a	reminder	that	a	judgement	was	needed.	
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Participants	had	to	press	the	appropriate	button,	“yes”	or	“no”,	to	indicate	whether	they	
thought	it	was	a	sensible	continuation	from	the	rest	of	the	passage.	The	time	between	
passages,	during	which	the	screen	was	blank,	was	1	second.	In	case	some	people	found	that	
this	time	was	too	short,	participants	were	instructed	that	they	could	pause	for	as	long	as	
they	wished	when	the	saw	the	words	“NEXT	ITEM”.	All	participants	answered	“yes”	with	
their	dominant	hand	and	“no”	with	their	other	hand.	They	were	not	told	whether	or	not	
their	answers	were	correct.	
Before	the	experiment	proper	there	were	6	practice	trials	to	familiarize	participants	
with	the	experimental	procedure	and	with	the	kind	of	passages	they	would	be	reading.	
There	was	1	passage	in	each	of	the	four	conditions	defined	by	the	factors	of	type	of	
antecedent	and	type	of	anaphor,	and	two	passages	that	were	intended	to	elicit	“no”	
responses.		
Results		
Times	to	make	positive	judgements.	Out	of	a	total	of	1024	responses	to	
experimental	passages,	175	(17%)	were	negative.		In	addition	28	data	points	(3%)	were	
replaced	because	they	lay	more	than	2.5	standard	deviations	above	the	participant’s	mean.	
These	data	points	were	replaced	by	the	cutoff	value.	The	remaining	times	were	subject	to	
two	analyses	of	variance,	one	in	which	participants	was	the	random	factor	and	one	in	which	
passages	was	the	random	factor.	The	mean	times	to	make	positive	judgements	are	shown	in	
Table	2.	
----------------------	
Table	2	about	here	
-----------------------	
Garnham	et	al.																																																																				Looking	Back	to	“Anaphoric	Islands”		10	
There	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	type	of	antecedent	(noun	phrase	vs.	verb),	F1(1,	31)	=	
6.27,	p	=	.017,	Cohen’s	d	=	.44;	F2(1,	31)	=	5.64,	p	=	.024,	Cohen’s	d	=	.42.	There	was	also	an	
interaction	between	this	factor	and	type	of	anaphor	(noun	phrase	vs.	pronoun),	F1(1,	31)	=	
5.11,	p	=	.031,	Cohen’s	d	=.57;	F2(1,	31)	=	4.47,	p	=	.042,	Cohen’s	d	=	.54.	The	interaction	of	
antecedent	type	and	anaphor	type	was	explored	using	post-hoc	repeated	measures	t-tests	
(Bonferroni	corrected).	For	the	implicit	(verb	based)	antecedent	only,	the	noun	anaphor	
(Mean	=	2128ms)	was	significantly	faster	to	resolve	than	the	pronoun	(Mean	=	2464ms),	
t1(31)	=	3.74,	p	<	.001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.66,	t2(31)	=	3.16,	p	=	.003,	Cohen’s	d	=	.56.	In	contrast	for	
the	explicit	(noun)	antedent	the	noun	anaphor	response	time	(Mean	=	2136ms)	did	not	
differ	from	the	pronoun	anaphor	(mean	=	2066ms),	t1(31)	=	0.78,	p	=	0.44,	t2(31)	=	1.07,	p	=	
0.29.	Judgements	were	faster	following	anaphors	with	noun	phrase	antecedents	than	
following	anaphors	with	verbal	antecedents,	though	this	effect	was	confined	to	pronominal	
anaphors.	
Number	of	Positive	Judgements.		The	percentage	of	positive	judgements	in	the	main	
experimental	conditions	is	also	shown	in	Table	2.	Both	main	effects	and	their	interaction	
were	significant:	Type	of	antecedent,	F1(1,	31)	=	24.22,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.88;	F2(1,	31)	
=	27.11,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.94;	Type	of	anaphor,	F1(1,	31)	=	22.80,	p	<.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	
.76;	F2(1,	31)	=	17.41,	p	<.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.68	;	Interaction,	F1(1,	31)	=	17.40,	p	<.0001,	
Cohen’s	d	=	1.05,	F2(1,	31)	=	23.60,	p	<.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.2.	The	interaction	for	
antecedent	type	by	anaphor	was	explored	using	post-hoc	repeated	measure	t-tests	
(Bonferroni	corrected).	For	the	implicit	(verb)	antecedent	only,	the	noun	anaphor	was	
significantly	more	accurately	resolved	(Mean	=89.8%)	than	the	pronoun	(Mean	=	63.3),	
t1(31)	=	8.99,	p	<	.001;	t2(31)	=	10.46,	p	<	.001,	both	Cohen’s	d	>	1.5.	In	contrast,	accuracy	
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for	the	explicit	(noun)	antedent	the	noun	anaphor	(Mean	=	90.2%)	did	not	differ	from	the	
pronoun	anaphor	(Mean	=	88.3%),	t1(31)	=	.64,	p	=	.52;	t2(31)	=	.75,	p	=	.46		
	
There	were	fewer	positive	judgements	for	pronominal	anaphors	with	verbal	antecedents	
than	for	the	other	three	conditions.	
Discussion	
In	a	direct	comparison,	we	found	that	pronominal	and	full	noun	phrase	anaphors	
behave	differently	with	immediately	preceding	verbal	antecedents.	Noun	phrase	anaphors	
were	not	affected,	either	in	the	number	of	positive	judgements	or	the	time	to	make	a	
positive	judgement,	when	a	nonstandard	(implicit)	verbal	antecedent	replaced	the	standard	
noun	phrase	antecedent.	Pronouns	were	affected	on	both	scores1.	
Experiment	1	used	passages	in	the	present	tense,	so	that	there	was	a	superficial	
match	between	the	implicit	“verbal”	antecedent	(“lies”	the	verb)	and	the	explicit	nominal	
antecedent	(“lies”	the	noun).	Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988)	showed	that,	at	least	in	the	case	
of	pronominal	antecedents,	this	superficial	match	increased	the	number	of	positive	
judgements	that	a	pronoun	was	acceptable	following	an	implicit	verbal	antecedent.	It	is	
possible	that	such	superficial	matching	might	have	affected	the	results	in	the	verbal	
conditions	of	Experiment	1,	and	in	particular	that	it	might	have	masked	some	difficulty	in	
the	case	of	the	full	noun	phrase	anaphors.	We	therefore	repeated	Experiment	1	with	the	
passages	in	the	past	tense,	so	that	the	exact	superficial	match	between	the	verb	(e.g.	“lied”	
in	this	second	Experiment)	and	the	cognate	plural	noun	(“lies”)	was	broken.	
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Experiment	2	
Method	
Participants.	The	participants	were	32	members	of	the	staff	and	student	populations	
of	Sussex	University,	who	had	not	taken	part	in	Experiment	1	or	any	other	similar	
experiment.	They	were	paid	for	their	participation.	
Materials.	The	materials	were	based	on	those	used	in	Experiment	1.	Each	passage	
had	all	verbs	changed	from	present	to	past	tense.	The	four	passages	derived	from	one	set	of	
materials	are	shown	in	Table	3.	
----------------------	
Table	3	about	here	
-----------------------	
Apparatus.	The	apparatus	was	the	same	as	that	used	in	Experiment	1.	
Design.	The	design	was	the	same	as	that	of	Experiment	1.	
Procedure.	The	procedure	was	the	same	as	in	Experiment	1.	
Results	
Times	to	make	positive	judgements.	Out	of	a	total	of	1024	responses	to	
experimental	passages,	149	(15%)	were	negative.		In	addition	29	data	points	(3%)	were	
replaced	because	they	lay	more	than	2.5	standard	deviations	above	the	participant’s	mean.	
These	data	points	were	replaced	by	the	cutoff	value.	One	participant	answered	“no”	to	
every	item	in	one	condition,	and	this	missing	cell	mean	was	replaced	by	the	participants’	
mean	plus	the	condition	mean	minus	the	grand	mean.	The	remaining	times	were	subject	to	
two	analyses	of	variance,	one	in	which	participants	was	the	random	factor	and	one	in	which	
passages	was	the	random	factor.	The	mean	times	to	make	positive	judgements	are	shown	in	
Table	4.	
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----------------------	
Table	4	about	here	
-----------------------	
There	was	a	main	effect	of	type	of	antecedent	(noun	phrase	vs.	verb),	F1(1,	31)	=	19.81,	p	<	
.001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.79;	F2(1,	31)	=	13.05,	p	<	.005,	Cohen’s	d	=	.64.	There	was	also	an	
interaction	between	this	factor	and	type	of	anaphor	(noun	phrase	vs.	pronoun),	which	just	
missed	conventional	levels	of	significance	in	the	by-subjects	analysis,	F1(1,	31)	=	3.98,	p	=	
.055,	Cohen’s	d	=	.51,	F2(1,	31)	=	6.17,	p	<	.05,	Cohen’s	d	=	.63).	As	in	Experiment	1,	the	
interaction	for	antecedent	type	by	anaphor	was	explored	using	post-hoc	repeated	measure	
t-tests	(Bonferroni	corrected).	As	in	Experiment	1,	judgements	were	faster	following	
anaphors	with	noun	phrase	antecedents	than	following	anaphors	with	verbal	antecedents	
For	the	implicit	(verb	based)	antecedent	only,	the	noun	anaphor	was	significantly	faster	to	
resolve	(Mean	=	1936ms)	than	the	pronoun	(Mean	=	2186ms),	t1(31)	=	3.75,	p	<.001,	
Cohen’s	d	=	0.66,	t2(31)	=	5.24,	p	<	.001,	Cohen’s	d	=	.93.	In	contrast,	for	the	explicit	(noun)	
antedent	the	noun	anaphor	(Mean	=	1842ms)	response	time	did	not	differ	from	the	
pronoun	anaphor	(Mean	=	1826ms),	t1(31)	=	0.24,	p=0.81,	t2(31)	=	0.27,	p=0.79.		
	
Number	of	Positive	Judgements.		The	percentage	of	positive	judgements	in	the	main	
experimental	conditions	is	also	shown	in	Table	6.	Both	main	effects	and	their	interaction	
were	significant:	Type	of	antecedent,	F1(1,	31)	=	35.86,	p	<.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.07;	F2(1,	31)	
=	53.73,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.3;	Type	of	anaphor,	F1(1,	31)	=	40.67,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	
=	1.1;	F2(1,	31)	=	42.25,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.1;	Interaction,	F1(1,	31)	=	38.76,	p	<.0001,	
Cohen’s	d=	1.5;	F2(1,	31)	=	51.27,	p	<	.0001,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.8.	The	interaction	of	antecedent	
type	by	anaphor	was	again	explored	using	repeated	measures	t-tests	(Bonferroni	corrected).	
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For	the	implicit	(verb)	antecedent	only,	the	noun	anaphor	was	significantly	more	accurately	
resolved	(Mean	=	94.0%)	than	the	pronoun	(Mean	=	60.0%),	t1(31)	=	13.37,	p	<	.001;	t2(31)	=	
15.4,	p	<	.001,	all	Cohen’s	d	>	2.3.	In	contrast,	in	the	accuracy	data	for	the	explicit	(noun)	
antedent,	the	noun	anaphor	(Mean	=	95.0%)	did	not	differ	from	the	pronoun	anaphor	
(Mean	=	93.0%),	t1(31)	=	0.78,	p	=	0.44;	t2(31)	=	.90,	p	=	.37.	As	in	Experiment	1,	there	were	
fewer	accurate	judgements	for	pronominal	anaphors	with	verbal	antecedents	than	for	the	
other	three	conditions.	
Discussion	
The	results	of	Experiment	2	were	similar	to	those	of	Experiment	12.	Noun	phrase	
anaphors	were	not	affected,	either	in	the	number	of	positive	judgements	or	the	time	to	
make	a	positive	judgement,	when	a	nonstandard	(implicit)	verbal	antecedent	replaced	the	
standard	noun	phrase	antecedent.	Pronouns	were	affected	on	both	counts.	
Experiment	2	broke	the	superficial	match	between	the	verbal	and	noun	phrase	
antecedents,	so	it	was	not	possible	to	explain	the	lack	of	effects	for	full	noun	phrase	
anaphors	in	Experiment	1		on	the	basis	of	a	superficial	match	between	the	anaphor	and	the	
implicit	verbal	antecedent.		
General	Discussion	
We	investigated	the	processing	of	(attempted)	anaphoric	references	into	anaphoric	
islands,	as	described	by	Postal	(1969).	We	compared	anaphoric	references	using	pronouns,	
as	we	had	previously	studied	in	Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988),	with	references	back	to	the	
same	object	using	full	definite	noun	phrase	anaphors.	For	the	case	of	pronoun	anaphors	we	
found,	as	in	Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988),	that	understanding	references	into	anaphoric	
islands	(“Little	Billy	lies…..they	(=	the	lies)…”)	were	slowed	by	about	400ms	compared	with	
parallel	references	with	NP	antecedent	(“Little	Billy	tells	lies…..they	(=	the	lies)…”).	The	same	
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slowing	was	found	when	the	exact	parallelism	between	“lies”(V)	and	“lies”(N)	was	broken	
by	switching	to	the	past	tense.	We	did	not	replicate	the	substantial	decrease	in	positive	
judgements	about	the	acceptability	of	the	sentences	in	the	past	tense	(without	exact	
parallelism)	compared	with	the	present	tense	found	by	Garnham	and	Oakhill	(1988).	For	full	
noun	phrase	anaphors,	reading	times	were	approximately	the	same	as	for	pronominal	
anaphors	with	NP	antecedents,	though	the	comparison	is	compromised	by	the	length	
difference	between	the	two	types	of	anaphor.	This	result	held	for	both	verbal	and	NP	
antecedents.	Similarly,	acceptability	judgements	for	NP	anaphors	were	always	high,	even	
when	the	antecedent	was	verbal,	and	were	similar	to	those	for	pronominal	anaphors	with	
NP	antecedents.	
These	results	are	readily	explained	within	Sanford	and	Garrod’s	theory	of	reference	
processing.	For	the	pronoun	anaphors,	an	NP	antecedent	places	the	relevant	reference	
entity	into	explicit	focus,	which	makes	the	anaphor	both	easy	to	process	and	perfectly	
acceptable.	A	verbal	antecedent	is	most	obviously	thought	of	as	placing	the	relevant	
reference	entity	into	implicit	focus	(the	extended	domain	of	reference).	It	is	hard	to	link	a	
pronominal	anaphor	in	such	a	case,	and	the	sentence	is	relatively	unacceptable	because	a	
pronoun	should	have	an	antecedent	in	explicit	focus.	The	NP	anaphors,	however,	are	able	to	
find	antecedents	in	the	extended	domain	of	reference.	They	are	acceptable	even	when	the	
antecedent	is	verbal.	In	the	examples	that	we	used,	sketches,	for	example,	are	a	very	likely	
component	of	a	scenario	in	which	an	artist	is	described	as	sketching.	A	noun	phrase	anaphor	
can,	therefore,	pick	up	this	antecedent	with	little	processing	difficulty.	The	morphological	
relation	between	“lies”,	the	plural	noun,	and	“lies”	or	“lied”,	the	verb	form,	may	aid	this	
processing.	
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One	unresolved	issue	is	why	a	pronoun	referring	back	into	an	anaphoric	island	incurs	
a	processing	penalty	when	pronouns	in	the	centrality	conditions	in	Cornish	et	al.'s	(2005)	
experiments	do	not.	For	example	in	(11),	it	(=	Mark’s	beard)	causes	no	more	problem	when	
(11b)	in	omitted	than	when	it	is	included.	
(11a)		 Have	you	noticed	that	Mark	isn’t	shaving.	
(11b)	 His	straggly	beard	makes	him	look	like	a	tramp.	
(11c)	 Yes,	in	fact	he’s	really	allowing	it	to	grow	now.	
	
One	possibility	is	that,	although	sketches	appear	to	be	central	to	the	activity	of	
sketching,	the	scenario	in	our	sketching	passage	is	actually	about	an	artist	living	in	a	village,	
and	sketches	are	not	so	central	in	that	scenario.	A	beard	(or	at	least	the	presence	of	facial	
hair),	on	the	other	hand,	is	central	to	a	scenario	in	which	a	man	is	shaving.	However,	even	if	
this	idea	is	correct,	we	still	need	to	explain	why	there	is	no	time	penalty	for	the	noun	phrase	
anaphor	with	a	verbally	introduced	antecedent	in	these	passages,	even	though	there	is	such	
a	penalty	in	the	standard	Haviland	and	Clark	(1974)	bridging	inference	cases.	It	may	be,	as	
suggested	above,	that	lexical	overlap	(“lies”/”lies”	or	“lies”/”lied”)	provides	a	crucial	aid	to	
mapping,	but	only	in	the	extended	domain	of	reference.	
Another	possibility	for	explaining	the	difference	between	our	results	and	those	of	
Cornish	et	al.	is	that	anaphoric	islands	are,	indeed,	a	special	case	where	a	syntactic	
constraint	(on	grammaticality)	applies,	and	that	people	are	slowed	down	because	they	are	
reading	an	ungrammatical	sentence.	Further	work	is	needed	to	decide	between	these	
possibilities.	Such	work	should	include	the	development	of	an	independent	measure	of	
centrality,	so	that	the	effect	of	centrality	can	be	properly	assessed.	
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Footnote	
1It	might	be	thought	that	the	explicit	(noun	phrase)	antecedent,	noun	phrase	anaphor	
condition	is	contaminated	by	a	“repeated	name”	penalty	(Gordon,	Grosz,	&	Gilliom,	1993).	
However,	there	was	no	evidence	that	such	a	penalty	occurred.	Despite	the	greater	length	of	
the	crucial	part	of	the	sentence	in	the	noun	phrase	anaphor	condition,	reading	times	were	
only	70	ms	longer	in	that	condition	than	in	the	pronominal	anaphor,	explicit	antecedent	
condition	(both	Fs	n.s.).		In	Experiment	2	the	corresponding	reading	time	difference	was	
only	16	ms	(both	Fs	n.s.).	
2A	combined	analysis	of	the	data	from	Experiments	1	and	2	provided	no	evidence,	either	in	
times	or	in	judgements,	for	any	difference	in	the	pattern	of	the	results	between	the	two	
experiments	(i.e.	there	were	no	interactions	that	included	the	experiment	factor).	
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Table	1	
The	four	passages	created	from	one	of	the	sets	of	materials	used	in	Experiment	1.	
Explicit	antecedent,	noun	phrase	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	is	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	is	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	makes	sketches	by	the	river.	
The	sketches	are	admired	by	everyone.	
Explicit	antecedent,	pronominal	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	is	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	is	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	makes	sketches	by	the	river.	
They	are	admired	by	everyone.	
Implicit	antecedent,	noun	phrase	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	is	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	is	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	sketches	by	the	river.	
The	sketches	are	admired	by	everyone.	
Implicit	antecedent,	pronominal	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	is	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	is	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	sketches	by	the	river.	
They	are	admired	by	everyone.	
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Table	2	
Mean	times	to	read	and	make	a	judgement	about	the	final	display	and	proportions	of	“yes”	
judgements	(in	parentheses)	in	Experiment	1	
	 Type	of	anaphor	 	
	 Noun	phrase	 Pronoun	 	
	
Antecedent	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES”	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES”	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES”	
Explicit	(noun	phrase)	 2136	 90.2	 2066	 88.3	 2101	 89.25		
Implicit	(verb	phrase)	 2128	 89.8	 2464	 63.3	 2296	 76.55	
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Table	3	
The	four	passages	created	from	one	of	the	sets	of	materials	used	in	Experiment	2	
Explicit	antecedent,	noun	phrase	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	was	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	was	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	made	sketches	by	the	river.	
The	sketches	were	admired	by	everyone.	
Explicit	antecedent,	pronominal	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	was	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	was	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	made	sketches	by	the	river.	
They	were	admired	by	everyone.	
Implicit	antecedent,	noun	phrase	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	was	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	was	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	sketched	by	the	river.	
The	sketches	were	admired	by	everyone.	
Implicit	antecedent,	pronominal	anaphor	
In	our	village	there	was	an	artist	called	Marvin	
who	was	quite	well	known.	
Every	Sunday	he	sketched	by	the	river.	
They	were	admired	by	everyone.	
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Table	4	
Mean	times	to	read	and	make	a	judgement	about	the	final	display	and	proportions	of	“yes”	
judgements	(in	parentheses)	in	Experiment	2	
	 Type	of	anaphor	 	
	 Noun	phrase	 Pronoun	 	
	
Antecedent	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES”	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES	
Times	 Prop.	
“YES	
Explicit	(noun	phrase)	 1842	 95	 1826	 93	 1834	 94	
Implicit	(verb	phrase)	 1936	 94	 2186	 60	 2061	 77	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
